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UNDER MODERN SALES LAW, PART 1*
A Comparative Study
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Introduction. American courts, particularly during the last decade, have
become increasingly aware of the need for protecting the consumer against
dangers inherent in the use of defective goods. In few other fields of law has
Corbin's advice to treat rules of law as "tentative working rules" been more
heeded.1 Continuously and relentlessly our law has expanded contract and
tort liability so as to satisfy public needs. Classical contract theory has under-
gone profound modifications in response to drastic changes in the structure
of the distribution process. Our sales law and particularly the law of warran-
ties likewise has changed. Where contract liability has been regarded as inade-
quate, it has been supplemented by tort law. There is an ever increasing ten-
dency to permit the consumer injured by defective goods or services to reach
the producer directly, if not with the help of contract law, then with the help
of a revised law of torts. Not only has the decline of the rules of privity per-
mitted the consumer to reach the producer, but product liability, in contrast to
the tenets of classical tort law, is straining away from negligence. In a fascinating
blending of tort and contract law, product liability increasingly is becoming
strict liability. A theory of enterprise liability has emerged, frequently based
on vague and unanalyzed notions of public policy and economics.
The dramatic changes in our law make a comparison of its development
with that occurring in civil law countries most tempting. Developments in the
market patterns in Western countries have followed similar if not identical
lines. Have these legal systems also responded to the challenges of market
organization in similar ways? It is proposed in this article to examine on a
comparative basis two main problems: The following pages will examine the
patterns underlying warranty of quality. The status of the remote consumer
or user of defective goods vis-a-vis the manufacturer will be examined in the
second installment.
THE SELLER'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUALITY
1. The Basic Pattern
A comparative study of the seller's responsibility for quality presents pe-
culiar difficulties. Warranty law in many legal systems has not achieved the
degree of rationality which is to be expected of a sales law satisfying the
needs of modern society. There is a considerable amount of confusion and
*This is the first section of an article to be published in two parts. The second part
will appear in 1965.
tSterling Professor of Law, Yale University. Visiting Professor of Law, University
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1. 1 CoannT, CONTRACTS § 3 (1963 ed.).
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tension in civil and common law countries alike. English and American law
are not in agreement.2 American decisions are frequently conflicting, not be-
cause of a healthy disagreement on social policy, but because of the lingering
impact of rules whose policies are long since dead. To overcome these
obsolete traditions, American courts have all too frequently resorted to the
technique of "backdoor building," to use Llewellyn's telling phrase, much to
the detriment of clear lines of rational development. The situation on the con-
tinent of Europe is not altogether different. Almost everywhere warranty law
still shows the traces of its historical connection with the sale of specific goods,0
so that many sales laws still differentiate between the sales of specific and
generic goods in cases involving nonconforming delivery.4 Perhaps the most
dramatic illustration of the difficulties in breaking with the past is the long
struggle of warranty law with caveat emptor, the principle that "he who does
not open his eyes, opens his purse" - a maxim reflecting a phase in the uni-
versal history of sales law when a sale was a cash and carry transaction.
In the process of widening the seller's responsibility for quality, the tech-
niques used by the civil and the common law were remarkably similar. Both
systems, in addition to according protection against fraudulent concealment
(dolus), allowed the buyer to bind the seller with formal collateral promises
of warranty.0 In both systems the gradual expansion of responsibility for
quality proceeded along similar lines. The formalism to which warranties
were subjected was relaxed more and more until finally sales law accorded
protection against any hidden material defects unless the parties had agreed
otherwise. In the civil law, where Roman law furnished the pattern of evolu-
tion, the break with caveat emptor by means of implied warranties occurred
rather early.7 The common law, by contrast, experienced a relapse to the
2. For a.penetrating criticism of English sales law, see Stoljar, Conditions, Warranties
and Descriptions of Quality in Sale of Goods, Parts I & II, 15 MOD. L REv. 425 (1952),
16 M OD. L REv. 174 (1953).
3. Rabel, The Nature of Warranty of Quality, 24 Tur. L. ER-. 273-77 (1950). 2
RABE3, DAs RECHT DES WARENEAUFs, 9a ZarrscmR " ruER AusL.A rscHEs & I'r'L
ParvAmscHT [hereinafter cited as 2 RABFL] 102-03 (1958).
4. See notes 17-23 infra and accompanying text.
5. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YAm.n 1J. 1133 (1931). HUm-
m6 GRmDZuEmEs DEUTSCHES PaIVATREcHT 579 (5th ed. 1930). Cf. Edvrards v. Hath-
away, 1 Phila. 547 (Pa. D.C. 1855): 'Uis eyes ... are his market"; 2 RA:Dr. at 274.
6. The dicta and promissa available to the Roman buyer andous for protection had
to be precise in content and had to be incorporated in the sales contract. Seckel-Levy,
Die Gefahrtragung beim Kauf im Klassischen Roemischen Rect, 47 Zsrrscnnsr DEf
SAVIGNY-STFT3NG (Rom. Air.) 117, 137, 202 (1927); but see Bucxi. , A TExcrnon
op Ro A-x LAw 491 (3d ed. 1963). The common law offers a striking parallel. In the
celebrated case of Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. Ch. 1603), "the
bare affirmation" of a jeweler that the stone sold was a '"ezar-stone" was regarded as an
insufficient warranty because the seller had not used the correct words of warranty.
7. The phrase caveat emnptor is not itself of Roman origin, but the principle existed
in the earliest Roman Law. BuCKLAD, THE MAnT Ixs-rruTioNs op Ro=zu PRIVATE
LAw 272 (1931).'
On influence of canon, natural and Germanic laws, see 2 RAn.L 112; RALB., HAFTUNG
DEs Vs a xEu ns 321-24 (1902).
19641
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principle of caveat emptor, so that the break had to begin anew in the last
century, and the process of emancipation is not as yet complete.
The Civil Law. Under the Roman is civile, the buyer was protected against
hidden defects only if the seller was fraudulent or had given an express
warranty. Fraud, for the Roman, included nondisclosure of known defects
as well as misrepresentation and concealment. 8 If the seller breached his limited
duties the buyer had an action for damages.9 The magistrates who had juris-
diction over the market, the curule aediles, created and administered a war-
ranty law which went a good deal further than the ins civile. The aedilician
law provided two additional remedies which were available even against a
non-fraudulent seller who had made no express warranty: within a limited
period of time, the buyer of a defective commodity was entitled to rescission
or diminution of the purchase price.' 0 The Corpus Juris, which brought together
civil and aedilician law, preserved the two systems of warranty liability.11
The civil law, continuing to expand the protection of the buyer against
significant hidden defects, has tried to develop a workable concept of defect.
Broadly speaking, it has a dual test for defect: a commodity is defective if it
is unfit either for ordinary use or for the particular use contemplated by the
parties . 12 But in providing a remedy for defects the civil law has not always
8. BUCKLAND & McNAm, ROMAN LAW AND CoMMoN LAW 300 (2d ed. 1936).
9. JoERs-KUNKEL, RoEaISCHES PRIVATRECUT § 144, 2-3 ENZYXLOPAEDIr DER RE:ClTs-
UND STAATSWISSENSCHAFT (3d ed. 1949); DE ZULUETA, THE ROMAN LAW OV SALE,
6-9, 46-50 (1945).
10. To suppress sharp practices, aedilician law required dealers publicly to disclose
enumerated defects in commodities as important as slaves and draft animals and to give,
on request, a stipulation warranting the absence of such defects. Gradually the seller's
responsibility for defects was extended to protect the buyer even without a warranty; and
eventually protection was accorded against all hidden defects. JOERs-KUNISEL, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 234-35. JOLowIcz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 303-04 (1932). This
seems in substance to have amounted to an implied warranty of merchantability.
11. See DIGEST 19.1.13; id. 21.1.28.63.
12. BUERGELICHES GESETZBUCH § 459 (Ger. 22d ed. Palandt 1963) [hereinafter cited
as GE MAN CIVIL CODE] ; OBLIGATIONENRECHT art. 197 (Switz. 1947) [hereinafter cited
as Swiss CODE OF OBLIGATIONS] ; CODE CIVIL art. 1641 (Fr. 57th ed. Dalloz 1958) [here-
inafter cited as FRENCH CODE CIvI]. The civil law thus combines objective and individual
(concrete) criteria in defining a defect. FLUME, EIGENSCHAFTSIRRTUM UuND XAUF 114-18
(1948) ; von Caemmerer, Falschlieferung, in FEsTscnRIFr FEUR MARTIN NVoIrX' 13 (1952)
(German law); 2 JOSSERAND, COURS BE DROIT CIVIL PosnrIF FRANCAIS no. 1119 (1930)
(French law); 2 ALMEN-NEUBECKER, DAS SKANDINAVISCISE IKAUFRECHT 1 (1922). Lacl
of fitness for a particular purpose, however, amounts to a defect only if the particular
purpose has become part of the bargain. GERMAN CIvIL CODE § 459 (1) ; 2 So aoE-Sit-
BERT, BUERGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 459 Amn. 6 (9th ed. 1962); 2 JOSSERAND, Op. Cit.
supra, at no. 1119.
Some civil law countries, rather inconsistently, regard the delivery of goods which do
not conform with an express warranty of quality as an ordinary breach of contract and,
therefore, not governed by the special rules of "warranty" law. 4 RECHTSVERGLEICHENDr
HANDWOERTERBUCH 727, 755 (1933); 2 RABEL 144. For a further discussion of French
law, see Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 TUL. L. REv. 529, 547
(1940).
[Vol. 74 : 262
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succeeded in emancipating itself from the Roman scheme of remedies which
granted damages to the victim of a fraudulent seller and the aedilician reme-
dies to the victim of an innocent seller who had not given a warranty. The lim-
itation of the buyer's remedies to rescission and price diminution if the seller
were innocent greatly appealed to the sense of equity of the drafters of the
civil codes.' 3 The German code, for instance, is still patterned along Roman
lines.14 As we shall see in the second section, however, modern German case
law is gradually modifying the code and is expanding damage liability.15 And
both the cases and codes of other legal systems, such as the French, have gone
a good deal farther than the German law.IG
Along with this distinction between fraudulent and innocent sellers, the
Roman law distinction between specific and generic goods has survived in
European civil law. Roman law, even in the post-classical period, retained
the early notion that a sale is a transaction involving specific goods or part
of a quantity belonging to the seller. The "sale" of generic goods was not
treated as a sales contract.' 7 The parties to a sale of generic goods had to
resort to the formal promissory contract, the stipulatio, which required that
all the terms be spelled out. Consequently, all warranties had to be expressed.
This resulted in the widespread use of standardized stipulations pertaining to
the quality of goods, particularly in the great wholesale grain and wine trades.'3
Nonconforming delivery was treated as a breach of contract giving rise to an
action for damages, rather than the aedilician remedies. To be sure, under
modem sales law the concept of a sales contract has been broadened to include
generic goods sold by description.19 But nonconforming delivery in such sales
is still often treated as a breach of contract, -0 giving rise to a right to demand
13. 1 WIuIsroN, SAiEs § 247 (rev. ed. 1948).
14. Gmu1rA CIvnL CODE §§ 459, 460, 462-63; Joms-Ku EJ., op. cit. suipra note 9, at
235; cf. FRENCH CODE CIVnI arts. 1641-49. For a discussion of French law, see Mazeaud, La
Responsabiliti Cizile Dit Vendeur-Fabricant, 53 REv. T um. DRorr Cwvn 611 (1955);
Morrow, supra note 12, at 529-56 (1940).
15. Text accompanying notes 60-71 infra.
16. Text accompanying notes 72-77 infra.
17. JoERs-KuxKEr, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 140, par. 3.
18. 2 RA EL 103.
19. In fact, going beyond Roman law, mercantile custom in northern Europe dating
back to the Middle Ages developed its o\vn "warranty" law applicable to sales of generic
goods, which entitled the buyer to reject the tender of goods not conforming to mercantile
standards. See 2 GOLDSCHiaDT, HANDBUCH DES HANDFLSRECHTS § 62 (2d ed. 1W3); Bar-
bour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity, in 4 OxroRD STUDIES n SOCIAL
AND L AL HISTRY 115, 116 (ed. Vinogradoff 1914); 2 RArE. 163-64.
20. Von Caemmerer, supra note 12, at 3-32 (comparative law); Enneccerus-Lehmanan,
Recht der Schuldverhaeltnisse, in 2 LEHRB UcH DES BUERGEiCHEIN REcnTs § 103, IA la
(15th ed. 1958) (German law) ; 10 PLAr. OL & RIPERr, TRArk PRATIQUE DE Daor COi L
FRA. q.aS no. 126 (2d ed. 1956). Delivery of an "aliud" has also caused difficulties to the
common law. Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M & V 399, 150 Eng. Rep. 1484 (1838); Stoljar
(pt. I), supra note 2, at 432-36.
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conforming delivery 21 or damages, while the aedilician rules governing breaches
of "warranty" involving specific goods, such as the duty to notify, the immedi-
ate right to rescind, and a short statute of limitations, frequently do not apply. 2
The buyer of specific goods, on the other hand, is not entitled to demand con-
forming delivery. Gradually, however, a process of assimilation in the treat-
ment of specific and generic sales is emerging. 23
The Common Law. At the time when civil law was seeking to develop sophis-
ticated warranty law, the common law still was stubbornly clinging to the
principle of caveat emptor.2 4 In fact, from the 17th century on caveat emptor
gained a new lease on life, because of the powerful influence of an emergent
individualism and notions of laissez-faire which strongly opposed the mediaeval
regulation of quality by guild, church and state. Widespread abuses had caused
a breakdown in the administration of quality control, and the whole system
had fallen into disrepute.2 5 Thus Lord Mansfield's rejection of the maxim
21. See, e.g., GERMAN CiviL CODE §§ 459, 462, 480. The remedies of the buyer find,
however, their limitation in the principle of good faith which may permit the seller to cure.
In most civil law countries the buyer of specific goods, by contrast, is not entitled to demand
or under a duty to accept cure. S. A. and D. v. B., Reichsgericht (II, Zivilsenat), Nov. 6,
1917, 91 Entscheidungen des Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen [hereinafter cited as R.G.Z.]
110 (Ger.) ; SCANDINAVlAN SALES AcT § 49; Swiss CODE or OBIGATI N art. 206. UNI-
FoRM ComMEclAL CODE [hereinafter cited as UCC] § 2-508 presents a striking parallel,
See Honnold, The Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 457 (1949). But for the
French law, see 19 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & SAIGNAT, T=alTL Tu-oRL-xXu. zr PRATIoUn:
DE DROIT Civm § 434 (3d ed. 1908). For the Austrian law, see ALLGEMEINE BuEzaruincut
GESETZBUCH § 932a (Aus. 26th ed. Kapfer 1960).
22. 2 RABE- 284.
23. HANDELSGESETZBUCH § 378 (Ger. 13th ed. Baumbach-Duden 1959) (hereinafter
cited as GEMAN COMMERCIAL CODE], as interpreted in S. W. v. B. & W., Reichsgericht
(II. Zivilsenat), Dec. 18, 1914, 86 R.G.Z. 90; UNIFORM SALEs Acr [hereinafter cited as
USA] § 49; UCC § 2-601. For a discussion of the UNIFORM LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODs art. 33, see note 113 infra.
24. Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552 (1860), could still maintain that common and civil
law applied fundamentally different principles:
The rule of the civil law, viz., caveat venditor, was adopted at an early period, and
in reference, as it would seem, rather to those articles which are of general and
ordinary use, than to such as enter extensively into the commerce of the country;
while that of the common law, viz., caveat emptor, originating in a commercial age,
and among a highly commercial people, naturally took the form best calculated to
promote the freedom of trade. No doubt the common lav rule is, upon the whole,
wisest and best adapted to an advanced state of society; and yet there is a large
class of cases in which that of the civil lav would serve to prevent a multitude of
frauds. Take, for instance, the article of horses. Few would deny that, as to them,
it would be more conducive to justice if the vendor were, in all cases, held to war-
rant against secret defects. But, as it would be impracticable to discriminate among
the infinite variety of articles which are the subjects of sale, the common law applies
the maxim caveat emptor, as a general rule, to all cases.
Id. at 558.
25. Le Viness, Caveat Einplor Versus Caveat Venditor, 7 MD. L. REv. 177, 182
(1943).
(Vol. 74 : 262
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that a sound price warrants a sound commodity2 6 met with general approval
in England as well as in most of the United States. Supported by powerful
arguments of public policy, the rule became firmly established that in the
absence of an express warranty or fraudulent misrepresentation, the seller
was not responsible for defects. In the words of Chief Justice Gibson of
Pennsylvania:
The relation of buyer and seller, unlike that of ccstui quc trust, attorney
and client, or guardian and ward, is not a confidential one; and if the
buyer, instead of exacting an explicit warranty, chooses to rely on the
bare opinion of one who knows no more about the matter than he does
himself, he has himself to blame for it. If he will buy on the seller's respon-
sibility, let him evince it by demanding the proper security; else let him
be taken to have bought on his own. He who is so simple as to contract
without a specification of the terms, is not a fit subject of judicial guardian-
ship. Reposing no confidence in each other, and dealing at arm's length,
no more should be required of parties to a sale, than to use no falsehood;
and to require more of them, would put a stop to commerce itself in driv-
ing every one out of it by the terror of endless litigation....,,2 7
Indeed, caveat emptor had a strong impact on and retarded the development of
not only implied but also express warranties. -8
But at the time Chief justice Gibson wrote his famous lines, the erosion of
caveat emptor was already well underway. Since to an ever increasing extent
trade was being conducted in goods not there to be seen, the needs of the
business community demanded, to use Gibson's own language, protection of
the buyer who "was necessarily compelled by the circumstances to deal on
the faith of the vendor's description."20 The Massachusetts court in Bradford
26. Stuart v. Willdns, 1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15, 16 (K.B. 1778):
Selling for a sound price without warranty may be a ground for an assumpsit, but
in such a case, it ought to be laid that the defendant Imew of the unsoundness.
In Parkinson v. Lee, 2 East 314, 102 Eng. Rep. 3S9, 392 (K.B. 1802), Grose, J. informs
us that the rule was rejected by Lord Mansfield, who found it "so loose and unsatisfactory
a ground of decision... :'
27. McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 57, 34 Am. Dec. 497, 499 (Pa. 1839). Also see
Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383, 388 (1870).
28. Compare McFarland v. Newman, supra note 27, with its emphasis on the require-
ment of an intention to warrant with UCC § 2-313; Note, 57 Ya .J. 1389 (1948), com-
menting on the UN- osa R-vsm SAL.Es Acr or 1948.
Unfortunately, the UCC in attempting to modernize the law of express %warranty,
has created new difficulties by introducing a "basis of the bargain" test which replaces the
intention to warrant still followed in English sales law as well as the reliance test laid
down in USA § 12. It is submitted that this formula adopts the liberal view taken in
1 W-LsToN, SAL.Fs § 206 (rev. ed. 1948) while at the same time maling sure that the
expectation of the buyer must be legitimate. See UCC § 2-313, Comment 3. The section
is discussed by Hoanold, "Study of the Uniform Commercial Code," N.Y. Law Rev. Com-
mission, Leg. Doc. No. 65(e) 58 (1955). Section 2-313 has revived old case law by mak-
ing warranties of description and sample express rather than implied warranties.
29. McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 57, 34 Am. Dec. 497, 493 (Pa. 1839). The
great jurist was most careful to limit this defense of caveat emptor "to the sale of a thing
1964]
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v. Manly 30 had already treated the exhibition of the sample "as a silent sym-
bolical warranty, perfectly understood by the parties." Chief Justice Parker,
in an opinion which may have been ahead of its time, informs us that "it would
very much embarrass the operations of trade, which are frequently carried
on to a large amount by samples [if there were no action except on express
warranties or false affirmation]." 81 Claiming to carry out the intention of the
parties, case law also revived old mercantile tradition, and gradually imposed
on manufacturers, growers and dealers who sold by description an implied
.warranty to deliver goods of a quality as high as that of goods sold in the
market under the same description,32 known as the warranty of merchantability.
Eventually classified as warranties implied by law,"3 the warranties created
from sales by sample and description came to accord protection to the buyer
of generic as well as specific goods, to the buyer for resale as well as the
buyer for use.34
To round out the buyer's protection a warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose communicated to the seller appeared quite early.85 It came to include
accepted by the vendee after opportunity had to inspect and test it . . . ." Id. at 56-57, 34
Am. Dec at 498; see Jones v. Just, L.R. 3 Q.B. 197 (1868).
The evolution of the case law and the changes in the mercantile background are given
in LLEWELYx, CASES ON SALEs 268-69 (1930) ; Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality anid
Society - I, 36 COLUm. L. Rxv. 699 (1936).
30. 13 Mass. 138 (1816).
31. Id. at 142.
Among fair dealers there could be no question but the vendor intended to represent
that the article sold was like the sample exhibited; and it would be to be lamented,
if the law should refuse its aid to the party who had been deceived in a purchase
so made .... [A] sale by sample is tantamount to an express warranty.
Id. at 143, 145.
32. Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Campb. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (1815); Prosser, The Implied
Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MitN. L. REv. 117, 121, 125-39, 146 (1943). On the
variant meaning of merchantability, depending on the contractual context, see Mathler v.
George A. Moore & Co., 4 F.2d 251 (N.D. Cal. 1925). Isaacs, The Industrial Purchaser
and the Sales Act, 34 CoLUM. L. Rxv. 262, 267 (1934).
33. Shepherd v. Pybus, 3 M. & G. 868, 133 Eng. Rep. 1390 (1842); Williston, Repre-
sentations and Warranty in Sales - Heilburt v. Bukleton, 27 HARv. L. REv. 1, 11 (1913).
The notion of an "implied" warranty is a constant reminder of one of the origins of
responsibility for quality: the express warranty. 2 RAnu 104.
34. LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 29, at 272; Corman, Inplied Sales Warranty of
Fitness for Particular Purpose, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 219.
35. Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (1829) (Best, C.J.), a case on
the borderline between express and implied warranty.
In the present case the copper was sold for the purpose of sheathing a shtil, and
was not fit for that purpose: the verdict for the Plaintiff, therefore, must stand: the
case is of great importance; because it will teach manufacturers that they must not
aim at underselling each other by producing goods of inferior quality, and that the
law will protect purchasers who are necessarily ignorant of the commodity sold,
Id. at 546, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1173.
Judging by their language, some of the early cases appear to be indebted to Pothler
who popularized the famous maxim: Unusquisque peritus esse debet arlis suae (in fra note
(Vol. 74: 262
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fitness in terms both of the function of the commodity itself and of the buyer's
business. But the development of this warranty was greatly retarded by the
stubborn survival of caveat emptor in sales involving "known, definite and
described" articles.3 6 In such sales, even where the seller was aware of the
buyer's purpose, the latter frequently remained unprotected unless he had
relied on the seller's skill or judgment. Dealers during the 19th century, par-
ticularly in this country,3 7 greatly profited by thls limitation. The "known,
definite and described" articles exception to w%-arranty of fitness, greatly strength-
ened by a rigid application of the parol evidence rule,3 8 has been dying very
slowly.39 Its traces are still visible to this day in the requirement of all three
major sales codes that in order to be protected the buyer must have relied on
the seller's skill and judgment in selecting or furnishing goods suitable for
any particular purpose of which the seller had reason to know.4 °
In the light of these developments the frequent statements in common law
cases of the last century emphasizing a fundamental cleavage between civil
and common law are no longer accurate.41 Behind the bewildering and fre-
quently conflicting technical details, a tendency towards convergence in the
treatment of latent defects of quality 42 is clearly visible. Both civil and com-
74). E.g., Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552, 562 (1860). This famous case shows, however,
the reluctance of the case law to invoke the implied warranty against manufacturers who
obtained their raw material from a respectable supplier and were unaware of its defects.
36. Corman, supra note 34, at 224-26. Jones v. Just, LIR. 3 Q.B. 197 (1863) ; Seitz v.
Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510 (1891). LLEWELLYN, op. cit. Supra note
29, at 272; Prosser, supra note 32, at 133.
37. Corman, supra note 34, at 232.
38. E.g., Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510 (1891); Morris v.
Bradley Fertilizer Co., 64 Fed. 55 (3d Cir. 1894).
39. 2 AfECHEm, THE LAW OF SALE or PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1349 (1901). To get
unstuck courts tended to expand either the notion of merchantability or of sale by descrip-
tion. As a result of this development the two warranties frequently, though not always,
amount to the same thing. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105
(1931) ; 1 WiLLiSToN, SALES § 235 (rev. ed. 1948).
40. The Sales of Goods Act, 1894, 56 & 57 Vic. c. 71 [hereinafter cited as SGA]
§ 14(1); USA § 15(1); UCC § 2-315. The UCC has, however, abolished an outgrowth
of this rule, the patent and trademark exception, provided for in USA § 15(4). See UCC
§ 2-315, Comment 5. This exception was inapplicable to the warranty of merchantability,
1 WILs-Irox, SALES § 236a (rev. ed. 1948) and its elimination -,vas foreshadowed by the
development of the case law. For a criticism of the English statute, see Co, , Errn ON
CoNsuiamm PROTECTION, FnCAL REORTr nos. 440 (merchantability), 447-50 (fitness for
purpose) (presented to Parliament by the President of the Board of Trade, Cmnd. 1781,
1962).
41. Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552 (1860).
42. In principle, civil and common law agree in limiting the protection of the buyer
to latent "hidden" defects. Of course, there are variations as to the meaning of the term
even among civil law countries. German law, for instance, goes further than French law
in protecting the buyer against patent defects. The former imposes on the buyer only a
limited "duty" of inspection and protects him so long as his ignorance of a defect is not
grossly negligent G=AN CIvzrr CODE § 460. See FRENcH CODE Cvxv. art. 1642. The
impact of the German rule, however, is modified by counter rules: a buyer who knowingly
1964]
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mon law put express warranties at the disposal of the buyer. Broadly
speaking their chief function today is to enable the parties to tailor the sales
contract to their individual needs 4 3 particularly to expand the seller's obliga-
tion so as to include qualities not covered by statutory or common-law implied
warranties.4 Their function and prerequisites thus reflect the basic structure
of the individual sales laws. 4U In according protection to the buyer who has
and without reservation accepts nonconforming delivery loses his remedies. GERMAN CIVIL
CODE § 464. For the availability of waiver and estoppel against a buyer who learns about
defects after acceptance, but pays without protest, see 2 SOERGEL-SIEIERT, op. Cit. supra
note 12, at § 464, Anm. 5. In sales between merchants under German law, the purchaser's
duty to examine the goods and to notify the seller of a defect is of great practical inpor-
tance. G Ptmmr COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 377-78. Under article 201 of the Swiss Code of
Obligations, the duty to notify extends to all sales. Also see FRENCH CODE CIVIL art,
1648.
43. In the language of Comment 1 to UCC § 2-313, express warranties "rest on the
'dickered' aspects of the individual bargain." The requirement that an express warranty
must be part of the bargain [UCC § 2-313(1) (a)] is not a peculiarity of Anglo-American
law. For the German law, see S. Sch. v. L., Reichsgericht (V. Zivilsenat), April 1, 1903,
54 R.G.Z. 219, 223; S. Witwe H. v. Z., Reichsgericht (V. Zivilsenat), October 5, 1939,
161 P.G.Z. 330, 337; and for the French law, see 2 JossERAND, CoUns Dn DRon' CIVIL
POSITIF FRANgAIS no. 533 (1930). But for the Swiss law, see Octo S.A. v. Spiegl & Waber
G. m. b. H., Bundesgericht (II. Zivilrecht), September 25, 1945, 71 Entscheidungen des
Schweizerische Bundesgerichtes 239 (Switz.).
Under the civil law assurances as to quality made subsequent to the contract will be
treated like other express warranties; the contrary rule of the common law resulting from
the consideration doctrine [Roscola v. Thomas, 3 Q.B. 234 (1942); Smith v. Fisher
Plastics Corp., 76 F. Supp. 641 (D.C. Mass. 1948)] has been abandoned by the UCC
§ 2-209, § 2-313, Comment 7.
44. Economic characteristics and satisfactory performance under special circumstances
furnish illustrations. See, e.g., The E. 270, 16 F.2d 1005 (D. Mass. 1927), illustrating the
difficulties in applying the implied warranty of fitness; 10 PLANIOL LT ImPErT, Op. Cit,
supra note 20, at no. 140 ("engagement d'assurer le bon fonctionnement de la chose yen-
due') ; GERMAN CIVIL CODE §§ 459(2), 480 (expressly differentiating between defect and
absence of a promised quality giving the latter a wider meaning); 2(2) SrAX;DINorAt,
KOMENTAR ZuM BUERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH § 459 (11th ed. 1955).
45. Closely related to the "dickered aspect" of express warranties is their impact on
exclusion or modification clauses. UCC § 2-313. Comment 4; § 2-316, Comment 1. Express
warranties, furthermore, are means of expanding damage liability. This is most important
for legal systems like the German which limit the buyer's remedies in the abtence of fraud.
An express warranty, finally, may limit, caveat emptor and protect the buyer who might
have discovered the defect by using ordinary diligence or by acceding to the request to
inspect. Swiss CODE OF OIuG IoNs art. 200; UCC § 2-316(1), Comment 8; the GrnmAn
CIvIL CODE goes further in protecting the buyer, § 460.
The importance of express warranties makes necessary a differentiation between im-
plied in law warranties on the one hand and "puffing" on the other. The development of
a workable concept of "express warranties" has caused much difficulty in those legal sys-
tems which require neither formal words nor a specific intention. The penetrating critlcism
of the express warranty concept by FLtUE, EIGENSCHAFTSIRRTUM UND KAUF 76 (1948)
and Yon Caemmerer, Falschliefeung, in FEsTscHarr FuER MARTIN WOLFF 18 (1952), Is
not only valid for the German law. Abolition of the express warranty concept should be
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not secured an express warranty from a non-fraudulent seller, civil and common
law, although applying different techniques,46 have worked out a dual test of
responsibility for quality. The goods sold must be fit for the ordinary purpose
for which such goods are used and, in addition, they must be fit for the par-
ticular purpose envisaged by the buyer.
Still, the dual test of defect adopted by the civil codes seems to give the
buyer a broader protection than its common law counterpart, the catalogue
of-implied warranties. Tinder both legal systems the seller's responsibility to
provide goods of a quality sufficient to meet the particular purpose of the
buyer presupposes that fitness for the particular purpose has become part of
the agreement,47 but under the civil law, the seller's responsibility is not predi-
cated on the buyer's reliance upon the seller's skill or judgment 4 Still, our
case law has shown a remarkable tendency towards an expansive interpretation
of fitness for purpose.49 Our implied warranty of merchantability, on the other
hand, has remained a dealer's warrantY. 0 This limitation primarily affects the
buyer from a nonprofessional; he is not accorded protection against latent
defects impairing the ordinary use of the commodity.51 This gap in the non-
professional seller's responsibility for quality has been narrowed by a broaden-
ing of the category of sales by description. Expansive as the category of sale
by description is, however, its domain does not reach far enough to make every
sale a sale by description, thereby protecting every buyer of specific goods
seriously considered. This would require adoption of a wide and elastic concept of "defect,"
preferably of "nonconforming delivery," an expansion of the damage remedy and a dif-
ferent approach to exculpation clauses, which should not protect a fraudulent seller or one
who uses a contract of adhesion. The Uxropm LAW ON THE I-rrt.mf TioNAL SALE OF
GOODS (text accompanying note 112 infra) has moved in the right direction on this score.
See arts. 33, 36, 38, 39, 41-46, 82, 84-87.
As far as "puffing" is concerned the common law seems to give more leeway for seller's
talk. See 2 RABEL 143; UCC § 2-313(2). But see Foote v. Wilson, 104 Kan. 191, 178 Pac.
430 (1919) ; 2 R _&nE 143.
46. For a criticism of the technique of the UCC in working out a detailed catalogue
clarifying "merchantability" see HoxNoLD, CAsEs oN SALES AND SALEs FnzANcING 74-75
(2d ed. 1962).
The UxrnoRm LAw oN THE INTENATIoNAL SALE OF GOODS art. 33, adopted by the
Diplomatic Conference on the Unification of Law Governing the International Sale of
Goods, The Hague, April 1964, is strongly influenced by the drafting technique used in
SGA, USA and UCC. For the text of article 33, see text accompanying note 113 infra.
47. See notes 12,35 supra and accompanying text.
48. 2 RAEL 167.
49. Martin v. J. C. Penney Co., 50 Wash. 2d 560, 313 P.2d 689 (1957) ; Kurriss v.
Conrad & Co., 312 Mass. 670, 46 N.E2d 12 (1942).
50. UCC § 2-314(1); SGA § 14(2); Prosser, supra note 32, at 121.
51. ATrYAH, THE SA1.E OF GooDs 63-64 (1957); 2 RP.AB at 172. The buyer from a
professional, however, is protected. Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A.C. 85,
100; but see Phares v. Scandia Lumber Co., 62 N. Mex. 90, 305 P.2d 367 (1956). Also
see HoxNoL), op. cit. supra note 46, at 79-83; Ruud, The Vendor's Responsibility for Qual-
ify in; the Automated Retail Sale, 9 KAN. L. Rsv. 139 (1960).
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against latent defects.5 2 The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code, in
their attempt to increase the buyer's protection, have opened the way to an
expansion of the warranty of merchantability in favor of a buyer who relies
on the seller's general statement that the goods are "guaranteed." The code
provides that its provisions dealing with merchantability may furnish a guide
to the content of the express warranty resulting from the statement of guaran-
tee by any seller even if he is not a "merchant" as to the goods in question."
In sum, it is by no means certain that, as a practical matter, the differences
between civil and common law are as great as they are thought to be. The
standards which measure the seller's responsibility under either system are
flexible enough to give courts a considerable amount of leeway in adjusting
warranty law to the needs of the individual situation."
2. Damages: Strict vs. Fault Liability
In spite of these similarities there remains, we are told, a fundamental differ-
ence between the common and the civil law of defects. Under civil law the
warrantor must respond in damages only if he was fraudulent or negligent.
Under common law, however, the seller, as a rule, is strictly liable for damages
when he breaks either an express or implied warranty; negligence is not a
prerequisite of the seller's liability.e5 Though the rule is known as the "English
52. Varley v. Whipp, [1900] 1 Q.B. 513, 516, extends the protection of the buyer who
"has not seen the goods, but is relying on the description alone"; 1 WILLISTON, SALLS
§§ 205, 224 (rev. ed. 1948). Smith v. Zimbalist, 2 Cal. App. 2d 324, 38 P.2d 170 (1934),
goes even further, but the warranty rationale advanced in that case is justifiably criticized
in HoNNoLD, op. cit. supra note 46, at 45.
53. UCC § 2-314, Comment 4. To increase the protection of the buyer still further,
Comment 3 suggests a culpa in contrahendo liability. The seller's knowledge of
... any defects not apparent on inspection would, however, without need for express
agreement and in keeping with the underlying reason of the present section and
the provisions on good faith, impose an obligation that known material but hidden
defects be fully disclosed.
For a discussion of culpa in contrahendo, see Kessler & Fine, Culpa in CoUrahmndo,
Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HAI. L,
REV. 401 (1964).
54. The lack of a detailed catalogue of implied warranties has made it easier for civil
law courts to apply a flexible standard. For a criticism of the technique used by Anglo-
American codifiers, see HONNOLD, CASES ON SALES AND SALES FINAN cIO 67
(2d ed. 1962) ; Honnold, A Uniform Law for International Sales, 107 U. PA. L. Rav. 299
(1959). "It is perhaps ironic," Professor Honnold states, "that English case-law at one
point came close to reaching the simplicity and the flexibility needed for handling sales
contracts when in 1877 Judge Brett wrote that there is one rule which 'comprises all the
others': the goods must answer 'the real mercantile or business description' which is 'con-
tained in words in the contract, or which would be so contained if the contract were
accurately drawn out.' But the law became complicated as judges, in the course of distin-
guishing unwanted precedents, created separate types of implied warranty surrounded by
technical and artificial rules. Codifiers conscientiously trying to preserve rather than to
reform perpetuated these technicalities." Id. at 313.
55. In Randall v. Newson, [1877] 2 Q.B. 102 (C.A.), the question was squarely raised
whether the undertaking of the seller under an implied warranty of fitness was absolute
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rule," most American courts follow it as well either as a common law principle
or as it is incorporated in the Uniform Sales Act.r1 Williston's defense of the
rule lays out the standard arguments:
The English rule may seem somewhat harsh at first sight, but on grounds
of policy it is probably superior to any modification of it based upon negli-
gence. If the buyer is compelled to contest the question of negligence with
the seller, he will find it very difficult to recover. In the nature of the
case the evidence will be chiefly in the control of the seller, and the ex-
pense of even endeavoring to make out a case of this sort wil be prohibi-
tive in cases involving small amounts.57
The civil law, by contrast, is still influenced by the principle that damage
liability, as a rule, presupposes fault, i.e., at least negligence.r8 The aedilician
or limited to skill and care in discovering a defect. Treating the implied warranty as a
contractual undertaking, Brett, J., adopted the former alternative; Frost v. Aylesbury
Dairy Co., [1905] 1 K.B. 608 (C.A.); Rodgers v. Niles, 11 Ohio St. 48 (1860); I
WimTox, SALES §§ 237, 237a (rev. ed. 1948).
56. 1 WumisToN, SALES § 237 (rev. ed. 1948). Williston has weakened his policy
arguments by his praise of the civil law solution which he regards as "intrinsically meri-
torious", but "so opposed to all common law authorities that it can hardly be regarded as
a possibility." See also Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Conmaner), 69 YALm L.J. 1099, 1124-34 (1960).
57. 1 WILLISTON, SALEs § 237a (rev. ed. 1948).
Williston is quite explicit in maintaining that his policy arguments in favor of strict
liability apply to all sellers and that no distinction should be made between manufacturers
and dealers. He continues:
Moreover, if the buyer cannot recover from the seller he cannot recover from anyone
for the defective character of the goods which he has bought. The wrong done by
the sale of defective materials to the manufacturer who later sold the goods cannot
form the basis of action by the ultimate buyer. Consequently, the real wrongdoer
who has caused the ultimate injury escapes. On the other hand, if the manufacturer
is held to an absolute liability irrespective of negligence, it will unquestionably in-
crease the degree of care which he will use, and if in any case he is compelled to
pay damages for breach of warranty where the real cause of the defect vs inferior
material which he himself innocently purchased, he will have a remedy over against
the persons who sold him this inferior material, and his damages will include what-
ever he himself has had to pay for breach of warranty. Thus the loss will be borne
ultimately by the person who should be responsible.
Ibid.
The absolute liability of the immediate seller is thus linked with the difficulties in
reaching the manufacturer in contract because of the privity requirement, an argument
that has lost much of its force due to the evolution of tort law. This argument will be
discussed in Part II of the article.
The absolute liability of the dealer has often been regarded as unfair to the innocent
dealer, particularly if the merchandise was sold in a sealed container, making it impossible
for the dealer to inspect it. 1 WiLLIsON, SALES § 242 (rev. ed. 1948).
58. GE zmAx CrM CODE §§ 275-76, 463. FREzcH CODE CrviL arts. 1147, 1645, 1646.
The warranty liability of the seller under the common law is one of the most striking
instances of the principle of "absolute" liability which, we are often told, is a characteristic
feature of the common law of contracts. In reality, the differences between the two systems
are not as great as they appear to be. German law, for instance, which has codified the
fault principle, has softened its impact by placing on the buyer the risk of ultimate per-
1964]
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law is exceptional in that it reaches the seller who is not at fault, but, at least
in its original form, this law provides only for rescission of the sale or reduc-
tion of price and not for full damages.0 9 But here again the gap has continuously
been narrowed and may nearly be dosed.
German law is still farthest from the common law, but even in Germany
the position taken by the civil code has suffered modification. Under the Ger-
man Civil Code, as was pointed out earlier, the buyer, in the absence of fraud
or express warranties, is entitled only to the aedilician remedies."0 Because of
social pressure, the German courts have increasingly expanded the range of
the damage remedy. They have enlarged the concept of fraud by extending
the provision in the civil code imposing full damage liability in the case of
fraudulent concealment, to cover the analogous situation of fraudulent mis-
representation of quality. 6' Cautiously, they have introduced the notion of a
warranty implied in fact, the breach of which makes the seller liable for
full damages. Finally, in appropriate circumstances they have modified the
scheme of the Civil Code by subjecting the negligent as well as the fraudulent
seller to full damage liability.
The expansion of the concept of fraud is of less significance than the intro-
duction of the concept of a warranty implied in fact. The Reichsgericht occa-
sionally has been willing to imply a warranty if the buyer has communicated
to the seller that the'commodity sold must be fit for a-particular purpose and
an intention to warrant can be found in the surrounding circumstances.02
suasion that nonperformance was excusable. GERMAN CIVIL CODE §§ 282, 285. Also, the
fault principle does not apply to breaches of contract involving objects of a general class,
as opposed to a specific object. Id. at § 279 (FRENCH CODE CIVIL art. 1245). The common
law, on the other hand, has increasingly reduced the domain of absolute liability by en-
larging the categories of excusable impossibility and frustration. E.g., Taylor v. Caldwell,
3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863) ; Joseph Constantine S.S. Line v. Imperial Smelt-
ing Corp., [1942] A.C. 154; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 457 (1932); 6 CODIN, Com-
TRACTs §§ 1328-29 (1962 ed.); Note, The Fetish of Impossibiltiy in the Law of Contracts,
53 COLum. L. REv. 94 (1953). For a general discussion, see VON MEIIREN, Tui CIVIL
LAw SYSTEM 684-86 (1957) ; 1 RABEL 329-45.
59. 2 RABFL 254-55.
60. The liability of the seller for the expectation interest, provided for in GEnMAN
CIVI CODE § 463, presupposes that the lack of quality of the defect was already in exist-
ence at the time the contract was entered into and was not cured at the time the risk
passes, 2 SOERGEL-SIEBERT, oP. cit. supra note 12, at § 463 Anm. 1. By contrast, the
aedilician remedies are predicated on the existence of defects at the time the risk passes.
GER N CIVIL CODE § 459. Under German law the risk of accidental destruction or dete-
rioration passes, as a rule, with delivery ( 446), or if goods are to be shipped (to a place
other than the place of performance) with delivery to the person designated to carry out
the shipment (§ 447). Cf. UCC § 2-509.
61. The case law is collected in 2 DAs BUERGERLICHE GESETZnUCII, KOMM ENTAR UND
BUNDESRICHTERN (11th ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as B.G.B.-R.G.RK.] § 463 Ann. 6.
The misrepresentation need not amount to a contractual warranty. 2 SOERGEL-SlEJItLT,
op. cit. supra note 12, § 463 Anm. 9.
62. Enneccerus-Lehmann, supra note 20, at § 108, II, lb; SOERGEL-SMEET, Op. Cl.
supra note 12, at § 459 Aim. 28.
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But this expansion of the warranty category seems to have been confined
generally to the sale of seed grain.ea
Case law of considerable practical importance has also supplemented war-
ranty liability by allowing in a sales context the breach of contract remedies
available to a creditor against a debtor guilty of faulty performance. 4 But
these attempts of the case law to "improve" on the warranty law of the civil
code have not been carried through to their logical conclusion. Until the risk
has passed, the buyer, according to the Reichsgericht, is entitled to reject
defective goods and to invoke the general provisions of the Civil Code for
breach of contract, including those provisions providing for full damage lia-
bility.6 Once the risk has passed, however, the special warranty provisions
embodied in the Code are said to take precedence.c But this distinction has
not been carried out consistently. After the risk has passed, recovery of dam-
ages against a seller at fault has been denied by the Reichsgericht to the buyer
if -defective delivery has caused only a mercantile loss (e.g., the usefulness of
the commodity was impaired). But even after the risk has passed, the seller
has been liable for the damages caused to the buyer's property or person by
the use of defective goods (e.g, meat spoiled in a refrigerator which was not
working properly, or a diseased animal infected the buyer's flock). C'
63. Reichsgericht, Oct. 25, 1921, 103 R.G.Z. 77; see further, S. Eheleute L. v. S.
Reichsgericht (II. Zivilsenat), Nov. 22, 1932, 138 R.G.Z. 354, 357. The reticence of the
Reichsgericht is quite understandable. A free use of the notion of warranty "implied in
fact" would substantially change German sales law which limits the remedies of the buyer
against the innocent seller to rescission and price diminution. S.B. v. F., Reichsgericht
(IH. Zivilsenat), July 6, 1926, 114 R.G.Z. 239, 241; S. Witve H. v. Z., Reichsgericht (V.
Zivilsenat), Oct. 5, 1939, 161 R.GZ. 330, 336-37.
64. The German Civil Code deals expressly with only tvo categories of nonperform-
ance: impossibility and delay in performance (Vermrg). To close the gap German case
law has created the category of faulty performance (positive Vertrogsverletung, often
called Forderungsverletzung). Vox MEHREN, op. cit. stpra note 58, at 684-86 (collecting
authorities and literature); 2 RAWu. 257. To be liable for positive Veriragsvrletmng the
debtor must be at fault. 2 Enneccerus-Lehmann, supra note 20, § 55, II.
65. 2 B.G.B.-R.G.RK. § 459 Ann. 33.
If the buyer refuses to accept the goods, the seller has to prove conformity; the buyer,
on the other hand, who claims rescission (Wandlung) after acceptance has to prove defec-
tiveness. V. v. R., Reichsgericht (I. Zivilsenat.), Dec. 10, 1924, 109 R.GZ. 295, 296.
This reading of the law has enabled the Reichsgericht to say that the buyer who rejects
goods which do not measure up to an express warranty has an option either to accept and
claim damages caused by the defect or reject the goods and claim his full expectation in-
terest. L. & V. v. M, Reichsgericht (II. Zivilsenat), June 19, 1917, 90 RGZ. 332. Most of
the literature wants to limit recovery to the damages caused by the defect. 2 STAuDlNcnn,
op. cit. stpra note 44, at § 463 Anm. 19.
66. Literature and case law on this point are collected in 2 Enneccerus-Lehmann,
supra note 20, at § 112; SOERGEL-SIEBERT, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 459 Vorbem. 15; 2
B.G.B.-R.G.R.K. § 459 Anm. 39.
67. S. Greve v. Lefeldt & Lentsch, Braunschweig Oberlandesgericht (II. Zivilsenat),
June 20, 1911, 67 Seufferts Archiv 7 (spoiled meat); 2 STAUDINGER, op. cit. slipra note
44, § 459 Vorbem. 18 (tracing the diseased animal case from its origins in DIrss. 19.1.13).
See S. Gerling-Konzern v. Machsfabr. G., Reichsgericht (VII. Zivilsenat), Dec, 18, 1942,
1964]
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Liability, further, has been confined to situations in which the damage
has resulted from something the seller negligently did in performing the
sales contract. The Reichsgericht was unwilling to hold the seller liable for
damages caused by defects which, although existing at the time of the sale,
he negligently failed to communicate to the buyer." This denial of culpa it
contrahendo liability was based on an argumentum e conlrario: Since section
463 of the Civil Code provides for damages in the case of fraudulent non-
disclosure, the legislature must have intended to exclude negligent nondis-
closure. This reasoning, however, overlooks the fact that section 463 deals
with recovery of expectation damages.69 A recent decision of Bundesgerichtshofs
seems to have moved away from the traditional interpretation of section 463,
permitting recovery of damages in the case of gross negligence.70 Thus, though
the German law has expanded liability for fraud and negligence, it has not, in
the absence of a warranty, either expressed or implied in fact, abandoned the
fault principle." Despite these "advances," therefore, the German law is still
quite far from the common law in the treatment of warrant liability.
Other civil law countries do not share the attitude of the Germans. Code
provisions and cases have taken a more liberal view of the damage remedy.
The buyer who is entitled to rescission is entitled to be restored to the status
quo. If the seller was innocent, liability is limited, however, to the "expenses
incurred in connection with the sale."72 On the other hand, if the seller knew
170 R.G.Z. 246, 251 (another spoiled meat case). Cf. S. Witwe H. v. Z., Reichsgerlcht
(V. Zivilsenat), Oct. 5, 1939, 161 R.G.Z. 330, 337; S.H.E.M. Comp. in.b,1, v. B.ua.,
Reichsgericht (H. Zivilsenat), Jan. 17, 1940, 163 R.G.Z. 21, 32 [same fact situation as
General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960)] ; 2 Ennec-
cerus-Lehmann, supra note 20, at § 112, I, 3; 2 B.G.B.-R.G.R.K. § 459 Anm, 39; 2 RADI:L
254-57.
To justify the distinction it has been argued that special sales law was meant to cover
only the "direct," but not the "indirect" consequences of defective delivery. Since recovery
presupposes fault, i.e., at least negligence, a seller-dealer who has complied with the stand-
ards of customary inspection may escape liability. Bundesgerichtshof, March 15, 1956,
Juristische Rundschau fuer Versicherungsrecht, 1956, 259. For a discussion of the burden
of proof (risk of ultimate persuasion), see SOERGEL-SIEBERT, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 275
Vorbem. 41 et seq.
68. E.g., S.R. v. Firma Sch. & Co., Reichsgericht (II. Zivilsenat), March 11, 1932,
135 R.G.Z. 339, 346. Tort law, however, may serve as a corrective. See S.H.E.M. Comp.
m.b.H. v. B.u.a., Reichsgericht (I. Zivilsenat), Jan. 17, 1940, 163 R.G.Z. 21, 33-35; 2
SOERGEL-SIEBERT, op. cit. vipra note 12, § 463 Anm. 5.
This position has frequently been criticized in the legal literature, which advocates pro-
tection of the reliance interest; some legal writers even favor protection of the expec-
tation interest. 2 RAPE. 256; 2 B.G.B.-R.G.R.K., § 459.
69. Enneccerus-Lehmann, supra note 20, at § 112, I, 3.
70. LINDENMAIER-MOEHRING, NACHSCHLAGEWERK § 463.
71. The liability for the expectation interest for breach of an express warranty does
not presuppose fault. B.G.B.-R.G.R.K., § 463 Amn. 2.
72. "Les frais occasionnbs par la vente." FRENCH CODE CIVIL art. 1646. French case
law has shown a remarkable tendency to give this famous phrase a most extensive mean-
ing, without including, however, lost profits. Morrow, supra note 12, at 537-43. See Swiss
CODE OF OBLIGATIONs art. 208 (recovery of damages "directly caused"); 5(2) Osan-
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about a hidden defect, this limitation is not applicable.1 3 The case law, particu-
larly French law, under the influence of Pothier, has greatly expanded the
seller's liability for hidden defects, by including a seller who did not know,
but should have known - using a famous maxim, "unusquisquc peritus csse
debet artis suae."74 To increase the protection of buyers, the case law has cre-
ated an irrebuttable presumption that a professional seller is aware of hidden
defects in the goods he trades in.75 Thus, the manufacturer of a car or of a
gun is liable in contract to the buyer for faulty construction, and must reim-
burse his buyer even for damages the latter has to pay to an injured third
party.76
The Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods has completed this
evolutionary process by granting to the disappointed buyer recovery in dam-
ages in addition to the aedilician remedies and specific performance."
3. The Characterization of Warranty Liability
A substantial body of literature has consistently attempted to rationalize
the seller's responsibility for quality in terms of the express or implied inten-
tion of the parties.78 This rationalization is found in the common law litera-
ScHoENEaNERGER, KoMNTraR ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN CrIVIGESETZrucH art. 203 Anm.
5 (2d ed. 1936).
73. FRENCH CODE Cwvm art. 1645 (this section has been expanded to include not only
knowledge but also (grossly?) negligent lack of knowledge) ; SwIss CODE OF OBLGATIONS
art. 208 (seller liable unless "fault may in no wise be imputed to him."); AuzgmEINEs
BUERGERLXCiES GESETZBUCH art. 932 (Austria 26th ed. Kapfer 1960) [hereinafter cited
as Ausm IA CIr. CODE]; EHRENZWEIG, SYSTEM DES OEsTERE CxscHEN ALGmEm,-E;
GEsEazrucHs § 323, 4 (2d ed. 1928).
74. 10 PLANIOL & Rn'RT, op. cit. supra note 20, no. 134; PoTHIER, TPnIrg n -
TRAT BE VENTE no. 213 (1848). Mazeaud, supra note 14, at 611-18, points out that the case
law is subject to different interpretation and cannot always be reconciled. For his sum-
mary of the case law, see id. at 618.
75. Wallut v. Rouzeand, Cour de Cassation (ch. req, sect. comm.), May 10, 1909,
[1912] DalIoz Jurisprudence [hereinafter cited as D.] 1. 16 (Fr.) (dealer). 10 PLANIOL &
RiPERT, op. cit. supra note 20, at no. 134 (collecting authorities).
76. Soc. des Automobiles Rolland-Pillain v. Berchet, Cour de Cassation (ch. req.,
sect. comm.), [1925] Sirey Recuefl General [hereinafter cited as S.] 1. 193, [1926] D. 1. 9
(Fr.) (with note by Josserand); Soc. Piot-Lepage v. Calnottes, Cour de Cassation (ch.
req., sect. comm.), [1938] Dalloz Recueil Hebdomidaire [hereinafter cited as D.11] 53
(Fr.) ; Mazeaud, supra note 14, at 615-17; Morrow, supra note 12, at 542-43; 2 RAmR.
255-56. These cases seem to make it unnecessary for the injured buyer to resort to tort
law to be made whole. Morrow, stpra at 538-39, 542. But see Usines Y. v. X, Cour de
Cassation (ch. req., sect. comm.), [1937] D.H. 217. Mazeaud, supra, at 617-18.
77. Art. 41, 82, 84-87; 2 RABEL 267-70. Articles 82 and 86 limit the recovery of
damages by laying down a foreseeability test.
78. The German literature is particularly copious. E.g., SuFss, ,VEsEN uND R1Zc'Ts-
GRUND DER GEwAEHRLEISTU:NG F UER SACHMAENGEL (1931); FLUmE, op. cit. supra note 12;
2 LARENZ, LEHmBUCH DES SCHULDPECHTS § 37 (6th ed. 1964) ; 2 SoERGEL-SIEDEr, op. Cit.
.supra note 12, at § 459 Vorb. 9-35. For the common law see 1 Wrr.usrozi, op. cit. mlpra
note 55, at § 197; Costigan, Implied-in-Fact Contracts and M[utual Assent, 33 HAnv. L
REv. 376, 383-85 (1920) ; Note, Warranties of Kind and Quality undcr the Uniform Rc-
vised Sales Act, 57 YALE L.J. 1389, 1395 (1948).
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ture, but it is not altogether foreign to civilian thinking. Express warranties
fit most neatly into the theory since they truly represent the "dickered"
aspects of a sales contract.79 But even implied warranties are contractual
at their core since they rest on the presumed intention of the parties and are
subject to being displaced by valid disclaimer. Implied warranties, in the
language of Section 2-313, Comment 1, of the Uniform Commercial Code,
"rest so clearly on a common factual situation or set of conditions that no
particular language or action is necessary to evidence them and they will arise
in such a situation unless unmistakably negated."80
Modem sales law, in its desire to protect the buyer and his expectations
as to quality, is adopting the position that the seller is responsible for the
qualities which the buyer is entitled to expect in the light of all surrounding
circumstances, including the purchase price.8 ' This development honors the
principle of bona fides which permeates the whole modem law of contracts
and has brought sales law quite close to adopting the maxim rejected by Lord
Mansfield that a sound price warrants a sound commodity. 2 Indeed, the con-
viction is gaining ground that the function of warranty law is to establish a
"subjective" equivalence between price and quality.83
In implementing the contractual theory of warranty liability courts and
legislatures have puzzled whether non-compliance with warranty obligation
should be treated as any other breach of contract or as a special kind of breach.
Partly for reasons of historical continuity but mainly for reasons of expedi-
ency, most sales laws have chosen the latter alternative. The main, though
not the only, purpose of the special warranty rules is to make sure that rec-
lamations based on lack of quality are speedily made, administered and ad-
judged. To accomplish this end many sales laws have provisions imposing
79. UCC § 2-313, Comment 1; according to I WiLsLiS rO, SALES § 197 (rev. ed.
1948), not even express warranties can be fitted into the contractual scheme of things. The
elements of express warranties by affirmation which bind the seller without an "actual
agreement to contract" are broader, he claims, than those of a contract. This reasoning,
reflecting a voluntaristic theory of contracts usually attributed to Civilians, is strange in-
deed coming from the defender of the objective theory of contracts. According to Willis-
ton, warranty liability "may be called on obligation either on a quasi-contract, or a qllass-
tort, because remedies appropriate to contract and also to tort have been applicable,"
Williston overlooks the fact that "Anglo-American law, with its consensual-relational
duties, its feudal survivals and its original tort theory of contract, can stretch its concep-
tion of consensual obligation pretty far." Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal
Ball, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 731, 743 (1943).
80. See also UCC § 2-313, Comment 4:"... the whole purpose of the law of warranty
is to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell...."
81. Costigan, supra note 78, at 383; UCC § 1-203; Note, Warranties of Kind and
Quality under the Uniform Revised Sales Act, 57 YALE L.J. 1389, 1393 (1948).
82. See stpra note 26.
83. UCC § 2-313, Comment 4. In our law the question has often come up in connection
with the extent of liability under the implied warranty of merchantability. Mathleu v.
George A. Moore & Co., 4 F.2d 251 (N.D. Cal. 1925); Prosser, siupra note 32, at 137-39;
2 RABEL 131-32.
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on the buyer a "duty" to inspect at the earliest possible opportunity and to
notify the seller with reasonable promptness."s Short statutes of limitations
serve the same purpose.m
The evolution of a special warranty law has raised the questions of whether
it should displace altogether the provisions of the general law of contracts r"
(and for that matter of torts) in the area and whether its application should
be limited to quality defects or should be extended so as to give uniform treat-
ment to all cases of non-conforming delivery.
The answer to the first question should depend, of course, on the degree
to which the newly developed warranty law has been able to give satisfactory
service. Unfortunately, this approach has not always been followed: Germany,
for example, has neither succeeded in developing a completely adequate war-
ranty law nor has she been able to fill the inadequacies by applying the general
law of contracts or of torts. The reluctance to supplement the statutory scheme
of warranty remedies by judicially adding contract remedies was caused in
large measure by a doctrinal prejudice: the seller, the argument runs, who de-
livers a specific commodity has performed the contract even though the com-
modity is defective; he is therefore not guilty of a breach of contract, and he
must answer only under the special rules of warranty law. 7 Though the courts
have never rigidly adhered to this dogma, its force has still been strong enough
to prevent the German sales law from falling in line with the law of other civil
84. USA §§ 47-49; UCC §§ 2-605, 2-606, 2-607, 2-603. In addition, the buyer must
exercise his right of rejection within a seasonable time after delivery or tender and give a
reasonable notice of rejection. UCC § 2-602. See GERmAN CvIL CODE § 464 (acceptance
of goods with knowledge of defects, reservation of rights necessary); GERVAN COmuR-
CIAL CODE § 377.
85. Gm "x CIVnL CODE § 477 (six months unless fraudulent concealment); Fnzarcr
CODE CIVI art. 1648 (within a short time).
86. The troublesome relationship between warranty on the one hand and mistake
and misrepresentation on the other will not be discussed in detail. Since in many legal
systems the areas covered by these institutions are contiguous if they do not overlap,
disappointed buyers, anxious to recover or avoid payment of the purchase price fre-
quently have tried to better their position by resorting to the often more liberal law
of mistake or misrepresentation where a warranty claim %-as either not given or lost
because of noncompliance with warranty law. Smith v. Zimbalist, 2 Cal. App. 2d 324,
38 P.2d 170 (1934); Cotter v. Luckie, [1918] N.Z.L.R. 811.
It makes good sense to say that, in the absence of fraud, a buyer who has forfeited
his warranty claim should not be permitted to invoke the law of mistake to repair his
plight. 2 LARENZ, op. cit. supra note 78, at 56 (German law); e.g., Leaf v. International
Galleries, [1950] 1 All E.R. 693 (A.C.), discussed in Note, 13 MoD. L. Rav. 362 (1950);
Donavan v. Aeolian Co., 270 N.Y. 267, 200 N.E. 815 (1936).
For a discussion of Anglo-American law see HoNNor, op. cit. supra note 46, at 45-47;
Stoijar, Conditions, Warranties and Descriptions of Quality in the Sale of Goods - II,
16 MOD. L. REv. 174, 190-94; German law: FLuIm, op. cit. supra note 12; 2 LAnnnz,
op. cit. supra note 78, at 56-57; French law: 1 GumLou,.uw, Tn~r=As DE L& VENm r DE
L'EcHANGE no. 420 (1889) ; 10 PLANIOL & RnERT, op. cit. supra note 20, at 126.
87. SuEss, op. cit. supra note 78, at 49. The same position has been taken for the
Anglo-American law in VAIrE, THE LAW OF SALES 224 (2d ed. 1938).
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law countries. To abolish the more complicated and confusing interrelationship
between warranty remedies and general remedies for breach of contract, and
the attendant endless theoretical speculations, some writers have advocated that
the aedilician remedies have outlived their usefulness and that the aedilician
law be merged into the general law of contracts - that a breach of warranty
be treated as an ordinary case of nonperformance, 8
Tort Law. The adequacy of sales law controls the use of tort law, since the
need for resorting to tort law depends on the extent of protection accorded a
disappointed buyer by sales law. The wide protection available to the buyer
in the form of express or implied warranties and their counterparts in the civil
law has correspondingly reduced the usefulness of the tort remedy, especially
when the case arises between the buyer and his immediate seller.80 Even be-
tween the immediate parties to a sale, however, tort law still has its advantages. 0
Common law courts, for example, have historically emphasized the mixed
nature of warranty liability to give the buyer the benefit of tort law. 1 Under
the provisions of the Sales Act as originally drafted, a disappointed buyer
could not claim rescission and damages at the same time.02 To correct this
shortcoming, some courts most sensibly took the position that the Sales Act
was a "codification of contract, not of tort" and that a "regulation of contract-
remedy did not touch tort-remedy."0 3 Attempting to overcome the archaic
notion that no action could be founded on the death of a human being and
to give the plaintiff the benefit of a wrongful death statute courts have often
pointed to the "basic tort character" of warranty liability.04
88. KORINTENBERG, ABSCHIED VAN DER GEWAERLEISTUNG, JUSTIZBLATT FUR DEN
OBERLANDESGERICHITSBEZIRK KOELN (1947).
89. The liability of remote parties will be discussed in the second part of the article.
90. In Germany, tort law is of limited usefulness because German tort law in con-
trast to contract law does not recognize the respondeat superior principle. The master
is only liable for the wrongful acts of his servant if he himself was guilty of fault in
selecting or supervising. GERMAN CIVIL CODE § 831.
91. PROSSER & SmrrH, CASES Ox ToRTs 828-29 (3d ed. 1962).
92. USA § 69(2). But there is case law which maintains that recovery of special
damages is not prevented by rescission. Russo v. Hochschild Kohn & Co., 184 Md. 462,
41 A.2d 600 (1945) (the majority resorting to USA § 70); 5A CORBIN, CoN Aers
§ 1237 (1964). Oliver-Electrical Mfg. Co. v. I. 0. Teigen Constr. Co., 177 F. Supp.
572 (D. Minn. 1959); McKendrie v. Noel, 146 Colo. 440, 363 P2d 880 (1961) (although
there was a rescission, the damages awarded were actual, out-of-pocket expenditures).
But there is case law going the other way. Authorized Supply Co. v. Swift & Co., 271
F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 277 F.2d 710 (9th Cir.
1960). Under the Uniform Commercial Code the buyer is no longer required to elect
between rescission and recovery of damages. UCC § 2-608, Comment 1.
93. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society - II, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 341,
390 (1937). See, e.g., McRae v. Lonsby, 130 Fed. 17 (6th Cir. 1904) (earlier use of
tort law to provide a remedy) ; Note, 45 YALE L.J. 1313 (1936) (collecting authorities).
94. Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938); Jones v. Boggs
& Buhl, Inc., 355 Pa. 242, 49 A.2d 379 (1946); Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal.
App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954) ; Note, 43 CAuIF. L. REV. 546 (1955). There is a case law
to the contrary. E.g., Wadleigh v. Howson, 88 N.H. 365, 189 Atl. 865 (1937).
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An application of tort law to the area of disclaimer clauses has been sug-
gested in the Frencti literature.05 and has begun to emerge in Anglo-American
case law. The ever increasing and sweeping use of such clauses N was for a
long time defended and upheld in the name of freedom of contract,"7 but re-
cently has run into opposition. Statute and case law have always denied the
shelter of a disclaimer clause to a seller guilty of fraudulent concealment or
misrepresentation 98 and (in civil law countries) even to a seller merely with
knowledge of a defect.9 9 Going beyond this restriction, case law has attempted
to protect the buyer by narrowly interpreting the disclaimer clause or by hold-
ing that it had not been incorporated into the contract.100 Particularly in so-
95. Mazeaud, mpra note 14, at 621.
96. Customarily a distinction is made between clauses excluding or modifying war-
ranty liability and clauses limiting the available remedies. 2 RABu, 89-91; UCC §§ 2-316,
2-718, 2-719. Different policy considerations may apply to judicial control of these clauses.
Contrast, e.g., UCC § 2-719 with § 2-316; but note that § 2-316 in turn is controlled
by § 2-302. See the penetrating analysis in Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts
Relating to the Sale of Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for
Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 280-84 (1963); HoNNo.D, op. cit. supra note '16, at
112-13; Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARv. L. RE,. 318, 323-32
(1963).
97. See generally, 3 H. & L. MAZEAUD & Tuxc, TmRAra- TninoRrig ET PRATIQUE
DE LA RESPONSABILrr CIVLE ch. 9 (5th ed. 1960) (French law); Gower, Exemption
Clauses - Contractual and Tortious Liability, 17 Mon. L. REv. 155 (1954) (English
Law) ; Note, Contractual Disclaimers of Warranty, 22 WAsn. U. L. Q. 536 (1937) ; 2
B.G.B.-R1G.R.K. § 459 Anm. 6(d).
98. Baglehole v. Walters, 3 Camp. 154, 170 Eng. Rep. 1338 (K.B. 1811) (artifice to
disguise required) ; Ward v. Hobbs, 4 App. Cas. 13 (1878) (mere knowledge insufficient);
L'Estrange v. Graucob, Ltd., [1934] 2 K-B. 394; General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47
Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W. 2d 655 (1960). See Curtis v. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing
Co., [1951] 1 K-B. 805.
99. E.g., GERmAN Civm CODE § 476; Swiss CODE OF OBLIGATioNs art. 199; FRENcn
CODE CIVm art. 1643.
100. For a collection of the case law and the theories advanced, see Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1132
(1962); Comment, Warranties of Kind and Quality Under the Uniform Revised Sales
Act, 57 YA E LJ. 1389, 1400-04 (1948); Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Constmer
Sales, 77 HAxv. L. REv. 318, 329-30 (1963). Also see Durant v. Palmetto Chevrolet
Co., 241 S.C. 508, 129 S.E.2d 323 (1963); Stevens v. Daigle & Hinson Rambler, Inc.,
153 So.2d 511 (Ia. 1963) (redhibitory action); Guntert & Zimmermann, Sales Div.,
Inc. v. Thermoid Co., 31 Cal. Rptr. 99 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); King & Wexler, Commer-
cial Law, ANNUAL Suvmr Am. L. 319, 323-24 (1963).
Until recently, civil case law, by and large, seems to have preferred the technique of
restrictive interpretation. 2 RAEBE 187. The attitude of the German Law is illustrated
by Reichsgericht, (V. Zivilsenat) July 8, 1931, 60 Juristisd Vochenschrift 2719 (1931) ;
S.H.E.M. Comp. m.b.H. v. B.ua., Reichsgericht (II. Zivilsenat) Jan. 17, 1940, 163 R.G.Z.
21, 31; Bundesgerichtshof, March 15, 1956, Juristische Rundsclau fuer Versicherungsrecht,
1956, 259. A bolder approach has been advocated by RAisER, DAs RECnT DER Az;.mmrI
GERSCHAFTS-BEDINGUNGEN § 27 (1935). According to Raiser, Civil Code § 138, which
declares oppressive legal transactions void, gives insufficient protection. Section 138(2)
outlaws transactions by which one person "profiting by the difficulties, indiscretions
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called contracts of adhesion, courts have either interpreted disclaimer clauses
out of existence or have declared them invalid outright for reasons of public
policy.' 0 ' A tort remedy now has been added to this arsenal of mechanisms
controlling freedom of contract and protepting the consumer. Reflecting and
channelling a trend in recent case law in this country, Section 402A of the
forthcoming Restatement of Torts (Second) 10 2 imposes strict liability for
physical harm on a professional seller of a food product which because of its
"defective condition" is "unreasonably dangerous to the consumer." A com-
ment to this section provides that the section "is not governed by the pro-
visions of the Uniform Sales Act [or by the Uniform Commercial Code] and
is not affected by limitations on the scope and content of warranties . . . in
those statutes."'01 3 Thus tort law has here been used to strengthen d trend
in the law of contracts.104
Because of the limited scope of strict tort law, it will never make warranty
law, in the narrow sense of the word, superfluous. Indeed, the provisions of
or inexperience of another person causes to be promised or granted to himself or to
a third party for a consideration pecuniary advantages that exceed the value of the
consideration to such an extent that, having regard to the circumstances, the dispropor-
t'on is obvious." (Author's translation).
101. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A2d 69 (1960) (stand-
ard disclaimer clause of the Automotive Manufacturers Association incorporated in sales
contract limiting liability to replacing parts at factory held void against public policy) ;
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Andersen-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W2d
449 (1961) ; Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 245 (1964) ; Clarke v. Army & Navy
Co-op. Soc., [1903] 1 K-B. 155 (C.A.) (culpa in contrehendo by failure to give warning
as to dangerous conditions of tin cans, known to seller). See White v. John Warwick &
Co., [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 1285 (C.A.). The English Hire-Purchase Act, 1938, 1 & 2
Geo. 6, ch. 53, § 8(s), bars contracting out of the implied warranty of merchantability.
According to UCC § 2-719(3), "limitation of consequential damages for injury to the per-
son in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitatlon of damages
where the loss is commercial is not."
For a fascinating discussion of the "obligation du s~curit" imposing on the seller of
a commodity a duty to give instructions as to the use of the commodity bought, even in
the absence of a defect, see Mazeaud, supra note 14, at 618.
102. Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961).
103. Id., Comment h. According to the same Comment, the requirement that the con-
sumer give timely notice of the injury to the seller, provided for in the Uniform Sales
Act, is inapplicable also. Contra UCC § 2-607, comment 5. Contributory negligence In con-
trast to voluntary assumption of risk also is no defense. Also see Note, Disclainers o
Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 318, 330-32 (1963).
Cases illustrating the applicability of the voluntary assumption of risk principle to
defeat a claim for breach of the implied warranty that food is reasonably safe to eat are:
Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960); Shapiro v. Hotel Statler
Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 198
N.E.2d 309 (Mass. 1964).
104. That this function of tort law is not limited to the field of sales is illustrated by
the so-called "negligent delay" cases which aim at the protection of an insurable applicant
for life insurance (or his beneficiary) against the risk of dying uninsured because of an
unreasonably long delay in processing his application. For a discussion of the relevant
case law, see 40 COLUm. L. Rav. 1071 (1940).
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the Uniform Commercial Code imposing responsibility for quality and dealing
with the measure of damages are wide enough substantially to reduce the
need for resorting to tort law. Under the provision of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code on merchantability, a court might hold that a knife which injured
a buyer because a furrier left it in a fur coat 105 constituted a defect in the
merchandise. The imperfectly constructed stepladder selected by an old lady
after an opportunity to inspect would also be considered defective since such
present sales are also covered. 100 To the extent that a dealer is responsible
for quality under the warranty law of the Code, finding a duty to inspect and
a negligent violation of that duty become superfluous. 07 Since the Uniform
Commercial Code has rejected the "tacit assumption test," the Code's measure
of consequential damages should also be sufficient to make the injured buyer
whole.'08
There remains the question of whether sales law should strive for unified
treatment of the seller's responsibility under the contract.103 Many sales laws,
as we have seen, have heretofore tended to differentiate between delivery of
defective goods in the technical sense of the word and delivery of goods of a
different kind (aliud). Frequently, warranty law, with its special requirement
that the seller be promptly notified, has been applied only in the former situa-
tion while the latter was left to be dealt with by the general law of contracts.
Delivery of the wrong quantity also has often been excluded from the juris-
diction of warranty law."10 Some sales laws, unconvinced of the soundness of
the distinction or despairing of the possibility of making this system work, have
taken steps in the direction of a unified theory of nonconforming delivery.
The German Commercial Code, for example, has extended the requirement of
notice of the warranty law to cover both the delivery of an aliud and of the
105. Miller v. Svenson, 189 Ill. App. 355 (1914).
106. Kirk v. Stineway Drug Store Co., 38 IlL App. 2d 415, 187 N.E2d 307 (1963);
UCC § 2-314, Comment 1.
107. Warranty law, however, does not protect the customer who has not consummated
his sale. Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 fass. 224, 65 N.E.2d 305 (1946). A case
note, 49 COLum. L. REv. 156 (1947), pointing out that at the time the decision was rendered
the privity requirement prevented plaintiff from bringing a tort suit against the manufac-
turer. To protect the consumer, case law, occasionally, has imposed upon the dealer a
rather stringent duty to inspect. Santisse v. Martins, Inc., 258 App. Div. 663, 17 N.Y.
S.2d 741 (1940). On the duty to inspect, see Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability, 89
U. PA. L. Rzv. 306 (1941); Leidy, Tort Liability of Suppliers of Defective Chattels, 40
MftcH. L. REv. 679 (1942). See further Ebbert v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 126 Pa. Super.
351, 191 AtI. 384, aff'd, 330 Pa. 257, 198 At!. 323 (1938).
108. UCC § 2-715, Comment 2. Case law and literature inform us, however, that tort
law allows for a more generous measure of damages than contract law. 5 Com, Cori-
TRAcrs § 1019 (1964 ed.); PRossER & Sm rrH, CAsEs oN TORTs 796 (3d ed. 1962). For
pre-UCC cases in which breach of warranty and a tort claim were combined, see, in addi-
tion to the Ebbert case, stpra note 107, Gilbert v. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co., 237 AL.
249, 186 So. 179 (1939).
109. HoNNoLD, op. cit supra note 46, at 67.
110. See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
19641
HeinOnline -- 74 Yale L.J. 283 1964-1965
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
wrong quantity. The extension of the notice requirement, however, applies only
to contracts between merchants and does not protect the seller if the deviant
delivery was so severe that he could not have justifiably anticipated accept-
ance."' The Uniform Sales Act, unlike the German Code, requires the buyer
to notify the seller in all cases of nonconforming delivery1 12
Aware of the soundness of a unitary treatment of all cases involving
what may be construed as defective delivery, both the Uniform Commercial
Code 11 and the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods have
worked out a unified treatment of nonconforming delivery. Article 33 of the
International Code will be of particular interest to an American lawyer. It
provides:
1. The seller shall not have fulfilled his obligation to deliver the goods
where he has handed over:
a) part only of the goods sold or a larger or a smaller quantity of the
goods than he contracted to sell;
b) goods which are not those to which the contract relates or goods of
a different kind;
c) goods which lack the qualities of a sample or model which the seller
has handed over or sent to the buyer, unless the seller has submitted it
without any express or implied undertaking that the goods would con-
form therewith;
d) goods which do not possess the qualities necessary for their ordinary
or commercial use;
e) goods which do not possess the qualities for some particular purpose
expressly or impliedly contemplated by the contract;
f) in general goods which do not possess the qualities and characteristics
expressly or impliedly contemplated by the contract.
2. No difference in quality, lack of part of the goods or absence of any
quality or characteristic shall be taken into consideration where it is
not material.114
111. GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE § 378.
112. The wording of § 49, "for breach of any promise or warranty," is wide enough
to include all cases of nonconforming delivery. But the case law has not gone quite so
far. In American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 7 .,2d
565 (2d Cir. 1925), noncompliance with the notice requirement was held to bar a claim
based on delayed performance, but it was taken for granted that this notice requirement
did not apply to a claim for nondelivery. In Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 32
Del. 406, 158 A2d 814 (1960), § 49 was held applicable to nonperformance of a require-
meat contract. See generally 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 484(a), (b) (rev. ed. 1948) (collect-
ing authorities). The function of § 49, according to the case law, is to ameliorate te harsh-
ness of the common law rule that mere acceptance by or passage of title to the buyer
constitutes a waiver of any remedies for breach of warranty and at the same time to give
the seller some protection against stale claims by requiring notice. Whitfield v. Jessup, 31
Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948) (applying provision to sale for immediate conoumption and
criticizing Kennedy v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y. Supp, 121
(1923), which took a contrary view).
113. UCC § 2-601.
114. The requirement of perfect tender, frequently attributed to the comnmon law of
sales (33 CoLum. L. REv. 1021 (1933); 48 CoLUM. L. REV. 161; 3 WitxsToz, SALLS
§ 608-a (rev. ed. 1948)), has undergone a gradual process of erosion. USA § 45 softened
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To implement this policy, Article 44 makes sure that "in all cases to which
Article 33 relates, the rights conferred to the buyer by the present lav exclude
all other remedies based on lack of conformity of the goods."' "
the harshness of the principle in the field of installment contracts. The Uniform Com-
mercial Code still permits the buyer to reject goods before acceptance if they fail to con-
form "in any respect" Section 2-601. But the buyer can revoke an acceptance only if
"nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him" Section 2-603. It further provides
for "cure" of improper tender or delivery, § 2-508, and continues the development of the
law in the area of installment contracts. Section 2-612. For constructive criticism of our
law, Honnold, Buyers Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. Rnv. 457 (1949). For the distinc-
tion between warranties and conditions made by English Law, see SGA § 11(1) (b) (c);
Stoljar, Conditions, Warranties and Description of Quality in Sale of Goods - II, 16
MOD. L. REv. 174, 183-90 (1953).
115. Ascertainment and notification of lack of conformity are dealt with in Art. 38-40.
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